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STATE OF UTAH 
THE AMERICAN OIL COMP ANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPO-
RATION, a corporation, and FED-
ERAL INSURANCE CO., a corpora-
tion, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
10326 
Appellant below commenced an action against a sub-
contractor on a State Road Commission construction con-
tract to whom it had sold petroleum products. The com-
plaint also named as defendants the principal and the 
surety on a public contract bond secured by the parties, as 
alleged in the complaint, "in compliance with . . . Section 
14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953". 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Default judgment was entered against defendant Gen. 
eral Contracting Corporation. Both Appellant and Re. 
spondents then filed motions for summary judgment. The 
court below denied Appellant's Motion for Summary Judg. 
ment, granted Respondents' Motion for Summary Judg. 
ment and entered judgment against Appellant dismissing 
its complaint with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks: 
a) Reversal of the order of the court below denying 
its motion for summary judgment. 
b) Reversal of the order of the court below granting 
Respondents' motion for summary judgment. 
c) Reversal of judgment of the court below dismiss· 
ing Appellant's complaint with prejudice. 
d) Granting of its motion for summary judgment 
and entry of judgment in its favor and against Respon· 
dent aocordingly. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The first three paragraphs contained in Statement of 
Facts in Appellant's Brief appear to be accurate. The re· 
maining portion of such "Statement of Facts" appears pri· 
marily to be argument. 
Since both parties to this appeal are relying upon mo· 
tions for summary judgment filed with the court below, we 
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will summarize as follows the pertinent uncontroverted 
facts which were before the court below : 
1. September 25, 1961. 
Respondent United States Steel Corporation, as prin-
cipal, obtained from Respondent Federal Insurance Com-
pany, as surety, a statutory public contract bond in the 
penal sum of $768,781.50 under the terms of which the 
State of Utah, by and through its State Road Commission, 
was the obligee (R. 5). 
2. October 4, 1961. 
Respondent United States Steel Corporation entered 
into a construction contract with the State Road Commis-
sion, the performance of which was the subject of said 
bond (R. 4). Defendant General Contracting Corporation 
was a subcontractor of Respondent United States Steel 
Corporation under the terms of said contract (R. 32). 
3. December 11, 1961 through December 10, 1962. 
Appellant supplied petroleum products to defendant 
General Contracting Corporation at the Cart Creek Bridge 
near the Flaming Gorge Dam site for which it billed de-
fendant General Contraicting Corporation the sum of $3,-
725.10 (R. 34). 
4. December 13, 1962. 
The performance of said contract was completed by 
Respondent United States Steel Corporation (R. 42). 
5. May 2, 1963. 
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D. Gordon Stringham, Senior Accountant, Estimates, 
responsible for auditing, estimates and final accounts for 
the State Road Commission of Utah made the following 
administrative determinations for and on behalf of the 
State of Utah by and through its State Road Commission 
in his official capacity as Examiner and Auditor of the 
accounts of said contract: 
a) That the State of Utah had no claims to as-
sert against either Respondent United States Steel 
Corporation or against its surety, Respondent Federal 
Insurance Company. 
b) The amount due from the State of Utah to 
Respondent United States Steel Corporation (R. 42). 
6. May 2, 1963. 
"Final" field estimate was submitted on "estimate in-
voke" by said D. Gordon Stringham to Respondent United 
States Steel Corporation (R. 44). The amount stated in 
such final estimate dated May 2, 1963 was approved by 
Respondent United States Steel Corporation and ultimately 
was paid by the State of Utah to said Respondent (R. 43-
44). 
7. May 14, 1963. 
Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections 1-4, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, upon which Appellant relies in its complaint, 
was repealed. 
8. May 15, 1964. 
Appellant filed its complaint in the court below rely-
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ing upon Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
9. June 15, 1964. 
Appellant obtained default judgment against defen-
dant General Contracting Corporation in the sum of $3,-
773.00, plus interest, statutory attorneys' fees and court 
costs (R. 16). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE "THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY" THE-
ORY AND ARGUMENT PRESENTED IN 
POINTS I AND II OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
WAS NEITHER RAISED NOR PRESERVED 
IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL; THEREFORE, 
NEITHER SUCH THEORY NOR SUCH ARGU-
MENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THIS 
COURT ON THIS APPEAL. 
The arguments made by Appellant in Points I and II 
of its Brief are wholly foreign to the record on appeal. The 
record contains no reference to any "third-party benefici-
ary claim". On the contrary, the record demonstrates that 
Appellant's action was filed under and pursuant to the pro-
visions of "Section 14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953" 
(R. 2). 
Appellant's complaint contains only one count. It clear-
ly proceeds under and pursuant to the Public Bonding 
Statute. Thus, in paragraph 6 of the complaint (R. 2) 
Appellant specifically alleges that the execution of the 
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bond by the principal was "in compliance with ... Section 
14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ... " In paragraph 11 
of the complaint, Appellant alleges a belief that there are 
no other creditors - this too is a statutory prerequisite. 
Other creditors, if any, must be included as parties to the 
suit under the statute. In paragraph 12 of the complaint, 
Appellant avers that it is entitled to a reasonable attorn-
eys' fee by virtue of Section 14-1-4. In the default judg-
ment taken against defendant General Contracting Cor-
poration, pursuant to said complaint, Appellant obtained 
judgment for such stautory attorneys' fees (R. 16). 
The issues involved in this appeal were twice pre-
sented to the District Court, first on motion to dismiss the 
complaint prior to answer (R. 9-10) and second on joint 
motions of the parties for summary judgment (R. 37, 39-
40). On each of these occasions, Respondents filed mem-
oranda in support of their respective motions, discussing the 
facts alleged in the complaint, the theory of Appellant's 
case as stated by the complaint and authorities and argu-
ment in support of said motions. These memoranda are 
devoted wholly to the application of the respective bonding 
statutes (R. 18-23, R. 55-64). No reply memorandum was 
filed in response to either of these memoranda. No 
amended complaint was filed and Appellant did nothing 
of record to advise the court and the parties of a change 
of position or theory. 
Despite this state of the record, Appellant relies in its 
brief primarily upon a common-law third party beneficiary 
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doctrine. It seeks on this appeal to hang this theory upon 
paragraph 9 of its complaint which reads (R. 2) : 
"9. Pursuant to Exhibits 'A' and 'B', the de-
fendant's contractor and surety also owe plaintiff 
$3,773.00." 
Paragraph 9 follows a recitation in the complaint that 
Exhibit "B" is a statutory bond, that defendant General 
Contracting Corporation was a subcontra.ctor and that the 
subcontractor was liable to Appellant for petroleum prod-
ucts which it supplied to the subcontractor on the construc-
tion project. Paragraph 9, in this context, simply avers 
that by reason of the statutory bond, Respondents also, in 
::tddition to the subcontractor, are liable to Appellant. It 
certainly does not state a common-law cause of action. 
The contract itself (Exhibit "A") contains no third-
party beneficiary covenants or provisions of any kind. Ap-
pellant, however, now relies upon the provisions of the 
statutory bond which, by Appellant's own averments in 
paragraph 6 of the complaint, was obtained in compliance 
with the Public Bonding statute, to confer liability upon 
the principal of the statutory bond on a common-law third-
party beneficiary theory without the aid of either aver-
ment or proof that any such result was ever contemplated 
by the parties. It is respectfully submitted that, even un-
der our present broad rules of "notice pleading", para-
graph 9 of Appellant's complaint certainly cannot be con-
strued to allege a cause of action against the principal on 
such theory, separate and apart from the statutory claim. 
These Respondents clearly and reasonably interpreted 
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Appellant's complaint to be filed under and pursuant to 
Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections 1-4, Utah Code Annotated 
' 
1953. Their Motion to Dismiss served upon Appellant on 
June 4, 1964 (R. 9-10), and their subsequent answer (R. 
25-8) made the position of Respondents clear in this re-
gard. If this were not Appellant's true theory, it certainly 
had a duty, at absolute minimum, either to amend its com-
plaint to state a claim based upon a common-law third-par-
ty beneficiary theory or to demonstrate of record that it 
relied upon some theory not stated in its complaint. 
The record is clear that Appellant below sought to 
perfect judgment under rights created by statute. When 
it became apparent that it had failed properly to comply 
with required statutory conditions and that it was entitled 
to no relief under the statute, it has sought, through this 
appeal, to amend its pleadings, to alter its theory and to 
obtain automatic judgment from this court. We submit 
that it should not be permitted so to do. This court in 
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185 ( 1954) 
prohibited a party from making such a change in theory 
on appeal. The court there stated at page 269 of the Utah 
Reports: 
"Having by his own pleadings, evidence and 
instructions tried and rested the case upon the 
theory that the mother's negligence would bar the 
father, he is bound thereby, as the law of the case. 
He cannot now on appeal shift his theory and po· 
sition." (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, it has been held that where, as in the in· 
stant case, one contractual theory is pursued at the lower 
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court level, a new theory of contract recovery may not be 
introduced on appeal. Lynn v. Seby, 29 N. D. 420, 151 N. 
W. 31 (1915). See generally, 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and 
Error, Section 569 (1962). 
The precise question now before this court was before 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Dix Lum-
ber Company v. City of Boston, 289 Mass. 291, 194 N. E. 
117 ( 1935). In that case, as here, the action was filed 
under the State's Public Contractor's Bond Statute, but 
the materialmen failed to comply with the statute's terms. 
There, as here, on appeal, the claimant sought to pursue 
a common-law third-party theory, exclusive of the statute. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the third-
party beneficiary theory could not be interjected on appeal 
stating: 
"We see nothing in this contention. Its petition 
as well as the original pet~tion which began the 
case alleges that the bond was given pursuant to the 
statute and rights under a common-law bond cannot 
be established in these proceedings which were 
brought to enforce the security of the statutory 
bonds . . . Furthermore, the findings of the master 
show that it was the intention of all of the parties 
to the bond given that it was executed and delivered 
as a bond required by the statute. It is to be inter-
preted as carrying out that intent." (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is uncontroverted here that the bond was executed 
and delivered by the parties "as a bond required by the 
statute". We submit that the doctrine of the Dix Lumber 
case is sound and should be followed by this court. Its ap-
10 
plication in this case is particularly apropos because of the 
corollary rule of appellate practice that a matter should 
not be considered on appeal if it is not properly raised and 
preserved of record in the court below. This rule is stated 
as follows in North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. 
Co., et al., 118 Utah 600, 223 P. 2d 577 (1950) : 
"We are unable to pass on the contention that 
the motion to dismiss should not have been granted 
... The reason that we are precluded from consid-
ering this question is that issues were not framed 
in the .court below. We cannot pass on matters 
raised for the first time in this court." 
ACCORD: 
Huber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Company, et al., 6 
Utah 2d 15, 305 P. 2d 478 (1956). 
Rosander v. Larsen, 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P. 2d 146 
(1962). 
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Un-
der., 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P. 2d 135 (1963). 
Chumney v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 202, 381 P. 2d 84 
(1963). 
Hamilton, et al. v. Salt La,ke County Sewerage Im-
provement Distri.ct No. 1, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390 
P. 2d 235 (1964). 
It is submitted, therefore, that the common-law third-
party beneficiary claim of Appellant is at variance with 
the pleadings and the record, has not been properly raised 
and preserved by the Appellant and that this new theory 
is not properly before this court. 
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POINT II. 
EVEN ASSUMING FOR PURPOSES OF ARGU-
MENT THAT THE COMMON-LAW "THIRD-
PARTY BENEFICIARY" THEORY AND AR-
GUMENT HAD BEEN DULY PLEADED AND 
PRESENTED OF RECORD TO THE COURT 
BELOW, THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT AP-
PEALED FROM STILL SHOULD BE AF-
FIRMED BECAUSE THE ST AT UT 0 RY 
RIGHTS SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED BY AP-
PELLANT ARE EXCLUSIVE. 
Through Title 14, Chapter 1 entitled "Public Con-
tract'', Utah Code Annotated, the Legislature of the State 
of Utah has sought to protect the interests of mechanics 
and materialmen on public contracts by imposing upon 
political subdivisions of the State of Utah the option of 
either requiring a bond to protect their interests or in the 
alternative to waive sovereign immunity. In the event of 
the latter election, the political subdivision of the State of 
Utah can be sued as a private individual. However, a short 
one year statute of limitations is prescribed. See Title 14, 
Chapter 1, Section 3, Utah Code Annotated (now repealed) 
and Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 7 (the present statute). 
Section 2, Chapter 1, Title 14, pursuant to which Ap-
pellant's complaint was filed, specifically required the 
supplying of a bond for the protection of mechanics and 
materialmen, then imposed the following specific proced-
ural requirements: (Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953.) 
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1. If an action is filed by the obligee within six 
months after completion and final settlement of the con-
tract, any person who has furnished labor or materials may 
intervene. 
2. If no such action is filed by the obligee within six 
months from the completion and final settlement of the 
contract, any person who has supplied labor or materials 
may sue the contractor and his surety: 
a) in the name of the obligee; 
b) in any court having jurisdiction in the Coun-
ty where the contract was to be performed; 
c) within one year after the complete perform· 
ance and final settlement of such contract. 
3. All claimants and creditors who do not intervene, 
or assert and establish their claims, in such action, shall 
be forever barred from recovery upon such bond. 
Hence, whether the political subdivision chooses to re-
quire the bond or to waive Government indemnity, a strict 
and short one year statute of limitations applies. It is per· 
tinent to note that no such procedural requirements and 
restrictions were placed in Title 14, Chapter 2 entitled 
"Private Contracts", Utah Code Annotated, 1953. It fol· 
lows that the Legislature obviously much more strictly con· 
fined and limited statutory rights of mechanics and ma· 
terialmen when furnishing services or materials on public 
contracts. 
As set forth in some detail herein under Point I, Ap· 
pellant in its pleading affirmatively avers that the bond 
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here involved was executed by the parties and issued "in 
compliance with" Chapter 1 of Title 14. The bond itself 
recites (R. 5): 
"WHEREAS, it was one of the conditions of 
the award of the Commission, pursuant to which 
said contract is entered into, that these presents 
should be executed." 
It therefore cannot be disputed in this case that the 
bond here involved was executed by the parties as a re-
quirement of the State of Utah under the provisions of 
former Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections 1-4. The Appellant 
here was a member of the class to which the bonding stat-
ute was directed. This was a public contract. Appellant 
supplied petroleum products to a subcontractor. Appellant 
had no contractual relationship with the State of Utah, 
with the prime contractor or with the surety. Had it com-
plied with statutory requirements, Appellant would have 
been entitled to file an action under the provisions of the 
statute. It purported to do so, but failed to comply with 
any one of the following statutory conditions: 
a) action to be filed in the name of the obligee, 
b) in Daggett County, and 
c) within one year. 
The Legislature, in its wisdom, required the creation 
of statutory "third-party beneficiary" rights in favor of 
materialmen which had not theretofore existed to protect 
them against the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Such 
rights are subject to express statutory conditions and are 
created by the statutory bond. The Appellant here admit-
14 
tedly must rely upon the language of the statutory bond. 
That language should not be lifted from context. The en. 1 
tire bond, together with the statutory provisions pursuant 
to which it was executed and filed, must be considered to. 
gether. Being faced with an adverse adjudication in the 
court below holding that it had failed to satisfy the neces-
sary statutory conditions, Appellant here seeks to escape 
from the application of the provisions of the very statute 
under which its complaint was filed. It seeks to appropri-
ate unto itself the benefits of the statute without being 
bound by the necessary and incidental statutory obligations. 
This it should not be permitted to do. 
In General Electric Supp. Corp. v. Willey Electric Co., 
47 Ohio App. 196, 191 N. E. 706 (1933), the court faced 
precisely the same problem. In reasoning that the claim-
ants should not be permitted to have their cake and eat it 
too, the court there concluded: 
"In the .case before us, to hold that the statu-
tory action was not exclusive, but that the common 
law action still remained, would be to penalize the 
indemnity company upon the failure of the claim· 
ant to comply with the provisions of the act. In 
other words, it would be to read into the contract 
the statute which fixes liability on the indemnifier, 
but to read out of the act any protection thereunder. 
If the indemnifier is chargeable with notice of the 
statutory provisions, so must the claimant be 
charged therewith." 
And in the final paragraph, the court said: 
"We are therefore of the opinion that the law 
of Ohio is that the statutory remedy is exclusive and 
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the court properly sustained the demurrer to the 
petition." 
Similarly, in the case of Dix Lumber Company v. Bos-
ton, 289 Mass. 291, 194 N. E. 117 ( 1935), the court held 
that a bond, executed and delivered as a bond required by 
statute, must be interpreted as carrying out that intent, 
and could give rise to no common-law action exclusive of 
the statute. Long Dell Lumber Co. v. Carr Construction 
Co., 172 La. 182, 133 So. 438 ( 1931) is to the same effect. 
In Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. Southern 
Surety Co., 59 S. W. 2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) the court 
took a slightly different approach. There, the problem was 
the same. The claimant sought recovery upon a bond is-
sued pursuant to statute without complying with statutory 
procedures. The court there recognized the existence of 
common-law rights under the provisions of that particular 
bond but ruled that the remedies available to the claimant 
were confined to those described by the statute. The court 
said: 
"Even though the bond created a common law 
obligation independently of the statute, . . . since 
the bond was given in reference to the demand of 
the statute, it must be construed in connection 
therewith and . . . the remedies afforded by the 
statute were exclusive. 
"Since such statute provided that an action 
could not be brought on a bond given in compliance 
with the terms thereof after one year from the 
completion of the job, ... an action could not be 
maintained thereon after the expiration of said 
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period of limitation even though the bond be con-
strued as the common law obligation. 
"It would not be reasonable to hold that a con-
tractor and his surety, by reason of their having 
executed a bond in response to the demands of the 
statute, and in compliance with the terms thereof 
for the purpose of protecting rights created by th~ 
statute, should, by virtue thereof, be held responsi-
ble for obligations not authorized by such statute." 
This .case is particularly pertinent to an analysis of the 
instant case inasmuch as there, as here, one of the ques-
tions involved was whether the statute of limitations built 
into the contracting bond statute should apply or whether 
the general statute of limitations for contracts should ap-
ply. The court clearly and reasonably held that the former 
should be applicable. 
It is pertinent to note again in this regard that a one 
year statute of limitations is imposed by the statute 
whether the governmental subdivision elects to require a 
bond or to waive sovereign immunity. Appellant argues at 
page 10 of its brief that the "general statute of limitations" 
applies. If this were true, a one year statute would bar the 
materialman if sovereign immunity were waived, but the 
general statute of limitations would apply where an elec· 
tion was made to require a statutory bond. This interpre-
tation flies directly into the face of the clear and unam· 
biguous language of the statute. Such an absurd result 
certainly was never intended by the Legislature. 
In the case of Indemnity Insurance Company v. South 
Texas Lwnuer C01npany, 29 S. W. 2d 1009 (Tex. Com. App. 
17 
1930) the court was faced with the same problem. After 
analyzing and quoting the pertinent public contract bond-
ing statute, the court said: 
"The above statutes clearly imply that the rem-
edy there accorded to the materialmen, to enforce 
his cause of action arising under a bond such as 
the one herein involved, whether the bond be re-
garded as a statutory bond or not, is exclusive, and 
that his action on the bond is to be subject to the 
provisions of these statutes." 
One of the things which influenced the court in the 
Indemnity Insurance Company case, was the fact that there 
was such a significant disparity between the procedural 
provisions of the contractor's bond statute itself and pro-
cedures applicable to general contracts. This is true in the 
instant case as well since both the repealed statute and 
the present statute contain much more detailed and explicit 
procedural provisions than are applicable to the ordinary 
contract action. Certainly, under these circumstances it 
would appear that the Legislature intended that the reme-
dies made available through these public bonding statutes 
should be exclusive and that no other action should be 
brought except under the terms of the statutes. Otherwise, 
if the Legislature had intended the general statute of limi-
tations and other procedural requirements to apply, it 
would have enacted a statute similar to the private con-
tracting provision in Section 14-2-1 which relies upon gen-
erally applicable common-law rules for jurisdiction, limi-
tations of actions and party and notice requirements. 
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The application of the public contract bond statute 
is treated in Campbell Building Co. v. District Court of 
Millard County, 90 Utah 552, 63 P. 2d 255. The court there 
stated: 
"The bond required by the statute to be given 
by the contractor is for the purpose of protecting 
mechanics and materialmen. Section 17-1-1, R. S. 
1933. This statute is highly remedial for the bene-
fit of and to provide security for all persons who 
furnish labor and material on public work." 
The statute also was treated by this court in State v. 
Campbell Building Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 P. 2d 341. That 
case is on all fours with the case at bar with respect to the 
time upon which the statute of limitations commences to 
run which will be discussed below. Appellant cites and 
quotes from this case, asserting that it supports Appellant's 
theory of "non-exclusive" application of the public bonding 
statute. We submit that it does not. Appellant relies upon 
the following statement from the court's opinion in that 
case: 
"Claims of creditors against the contractor are 
not affected by the statute. We opine such .claims 
may be asserted at any time within the general 
statute of limitations." 
However, the court then continues: 
"It is only when it is sought to hold the surety 
- only when recovery is to be made under the bond 
- that the provisions of the statute come into play. 
The restrictions are two-fold: to give the obligee 
a priority to determine and protect any claim it may 
have, and to fix a one year limitation on the surety's 
liability to other creditors." (Emphasis added.) 
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Certainly, as is stated above by the court, creditors of 
the contractor would not be compelled to comply with the 
bonding statute. The statute was not passed for their bene-
fit. However, the Appellant here is not a creditor of the 
contractor. His only conceivable claim is derived from the 
language of the bond itself which admittedly was filed in 
compliance with the statutory mandate. Furthermore, Ap-
pellant does here seek "to hold the surety". Both in the 
court below and on this appeal, Appellant seeks judgment 
against the surety on the bond. It follows that "the pro-
visions of the statute come into play" and that having failed 
to comply with the statute, Appellant's cause must fail. 
Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 1 (now repealed) reads 
in pertinent part: 
"Every person entering into a contract for the 
construction or alteration of, or addition to, any 
public work, building, structure or improvement, 
shall, before the work under any such contract is 
commenced, be required to furnish a good and suf-
ficient bond for the faithful performance of such 
contract, and further conditioned that the contrac-
tor wvll promptly make payment to all persons sup-
plying labor or materials used in the prosecution of 
the work." (Emphasis added.) 
It is submitted that the language from the bond upon 
which the Appellant does and must rely is the very lan-
guage required by the statute, that the remedies prescribed 
by the statute are exclusive and that the failure of Appel-
lant to comply with the statutory conditions is fatal to its 
claim against the contractor and the surety of the bond. 
20 
A very nice question could have arisen in this case as 
to which statute applies. For example, it is clear from Ap-
pellant's complaint that it expressly relied upon Title 14, 
Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The bonding pro-
vision thereof (14-1-2) provided that "a right of action" 
would accrue in favor of a materialman "six months" after 
the completion and final settlement of the contract, pro-
viding that no action had been filed by the obligee on the 
bond during that period. However, substantially prior to 
the accrual of such "right of action" in this case, and on 
May 14, 1963, Sections 1 through 4 of Title 14, Chapter 1 
were repealed. Hence, the very statutory provisions under 
which the complaint was filed were repealed before any 
right of action accrued thereunder and before this action 
was filed. Hence, it could be argued that the court below 
had no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the claim un-
der the provisions of the repealed statute and that Appel-
lant's rights, if any, must be derived from the new provi-
sions contained in Sections 5-9 of the repealing statute 
(Title 14, Chapter 1). 
However, it was not necessary below and it is not nec-
essary here to determine which of the public eontract bond-
ing statutes apply for the reason that Appellant complied 
with the provisions of neither of them. Under the provi-
sions of either statute, Appellant's complaint was properly 
dismissed by the court below. The two statutes will be dis-
cussed below in sequence. 
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POINT III. 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RE-
COVER AGAINST RESPONDENTS UNDER 
THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER 1, 
SECTIONS 1-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953. 
Appellant's complaint was filed under and pursuant 
to the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections 1-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. Assuming, for purposes of this 
discussion, that this statutory provision is applicable, 
it does not benefit Appellant for the reason that Appellant 
failed to comply with three necessary statutory conditions 
which will be discussed below. 
a) Appellant was not a proper party and could 
not properly maintain an action in its own 
name under said statutory proviswns; such 
action must be filed in the name of the obligee 
on the bond. 
Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 2 of the former statute 
provides in pertinent part that a materialman may institute 
a direct action against the contractor and his surety "in 
the name of the obligee". 
The obligee under the bond is the State of Utah, by 
and through the State Road Commission of Utah. Appel-
lant has no standing under the statute through which it 
sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the court below under 
its claimed statutory cause of action to prosecute the ac-
tion in its own name and on its own behalf. The action 
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must be maintained, if at all, in the name of the State of 
Utah by and through the State Road Commission of Utah 
for the benefit of and on behalf of the Appellant. 
The requirement that the action be filed in the name 
of the obligee is not an arbitrary requirement. One of the 
purposes of the whole statutory procedure is to permit 
only one civil adion, to require all creditors to join and 
litigate their respective claims in the same action and to 
reasonably apprise all potential creditors of the pendency 
of such claims. An action on file entitled American Oil 
Company v. United States Steel Corporation obviously 
would not give laborers and materialmen notice of the pen-
dency of a statutory cause of action in which they may 
participate. On the other hand, if the statutory condition 
is followed and the action brought in the name of the 
obligee, for and on behalf of the claiming laborer or ma-
terialman, potential claimants would be alerted and would 
have an opportunity to intervene as provided by the stat-
ute. 
In its brief, Appellant relies upon Board of Education 
V. Southern Surety Co., 76 Utah 63, 287 P. 332 (1930). 
It is respectfully submitted that that case is wholly inap-
posite. There, the action was brought in the name of the 
obligee. The plaintiff had standing to sue and the court 
had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. 
That case holds only that the publication of notice to other 
creditors was not jurisdictional. Because of the language 
of the Board of Education case, Respondents did not raise 
in their motion to dismiss and memorandum in support 
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thereof or in their motion for summary judgment and 
memorandum in support thereof the failure of Appellant 
to publish notice to creditors. 
However, this court treated the precise question here 
involved in Utah State Building Commission, for. the use 
and benefit of M ountaim States Supply Company v. Great 
American Indemnity Co., et al., 140 P. 2d 763, 105 Utah 
11, which is cited at page 5 of Respondents' memorandum 
in support of their motion for summary judgment (R. 58). 
That case, the only case in which this court has treated this 
subject, is conspicuously absent from the list of authori-
ties cited by Appellant. There, the obligee on the bond was 
the Utah State Building Commission. The action was pros-
ecuted in the name of the State Building Commission for 
the use and benefit of the materialman. The defendant de-
fended upon the ground that the Utah State Building Com-
mission was not a "body politic or corporate" and that the 
action should have been brought in the name of the State 
of Utah. After ruling that the Utah State Building Com-
mission was the obligee on the bond and was a proper body 
politic or corporate, District Judge Crockett, writing the 
opinion for the court, stated: 
"The Utah State Building Commission was the 
only proper obligee on the bond, and the only en-
tity that could have properly brought this action." 
Similarly, here, the State of Utah by and through the 
State Road Commission of Utah was the only proper obligee 
on the bond, and the only entity that could have properly 
brought this action. The action, therefore, was properly 
dismissed by the court below. 
24 
b) The District Court in Salt Lake County had 
no jurisdiction to entertain an action under 
said statutory provisions for the reason that 
they require said action to be filed in the 
County where the contract was to be per-
formed. 
The statute upon which Appellant relied in its com-
plaint (former Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953) provides that a materialman may sue 
the contractor and his surety, but that the action must be 
filed in a "court having jurisdiction in the County where 
the contract is to be performed." It is undisputed that the 
contract here involved was to be performed wholly within 
the confines of Daggett County, Utah. 
Again, this condition is consistent with the basic pur-
poses of the public bond statute. To protect the interests 
of all possible laborers and materialmen, the Legislature 
specifically required the filing of the action in the County 
where the work was to be performed. If so filed, it would 
be a simple matter for all interested materialmen to keep 
themselves apprised of actions filed in the particular 
County involved in the name of the obligee for their bene-
fit. This vrould not be true if any particular materialman 
could commence an action in any County in the State of 
Utah. 
Under Point III in its Brief, Appellant asserts that the 
Federal Courts had construed "the Miller Act" to be "a 
venue requirement and not one of jurisdiction". It is true 
that some Federal cases have so held. However, we have 
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not found a ruling by United States Supreme Court on 
this issue, and the Federal authorities are in substantial 
conflict. Representative Federal cases holding that the 
Miller Act requirement (Title 40, Section 270 B, United 
States Code Annotated) that the action must be brought 
in the United States Distriet Court for the district "in 
which the contract was to be performed and executed and 
not elsewhere" limits the jurisdiction of the Federal court 
are: 
1) United States for the use and benefit of Green-
ville Equipment Co. v. U. S. Gas. Co., D. C. Del. 1962, 218 
F. Supp. 653. In that case, the court stated the applicable 
rule as follows : 
"This being an action under the Miller Act and 
the contract in question relating to work in Dela-
ware, this U. S. court for the District of Delaware 
has the exclusive statutory jurisdiction." 
2) U. S. for use and benefit of Fairbanks Morse & 
Co. v. Bero Const. Corp., D. C. N. Y. 1957, 148 F. Supp. 
295. In that case, the court stated the rule as follows: 
"Jurisdiction under the statute is therefore 
vested solely in the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia where such contract was to be 
performed and executed. The requirement that the 
action be brought in the District where the contract 
was to be performed and executed is a jurisdic-
tional requirement. It is not met by bringing suit 
in this District which has no jurisdiction over the 
controversy. United States, to use of New York 
Plumbers' Specialties Co. v. Silverburgh Construc-
tion Co., D. C. E. D. N. Y., 10 F. Supp. 121; United 
States, for use and benefit of Johnson v. Morley 
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Construction Co., D. C. W. D. N. Y., 17 F. Supp. 
378." 
The Utah statute here involved by its express terms 
constitutes a limited and conditional waiver of Governmen-
tal immunity. To obtain rights thereunder, materialmen 
must comply strictly with the statutory conditions imposed. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not yet resolved 
this precise issue, it has ruled under a somewhat analo-
gous situation that the conditions contained in a statutory 
cause of action must be strictly complied with. Title 30, 
Chapter 3, Section 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 provides 
that the District Court may enter a decree of divorce where 
"plaintiff shall have been an actual and bona fide resident 
of this State and of the .county where the action is brought 
for three months next prior to the commencement of the 
action". In Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P. 2d 1005, 
this court ruled that where the statutory condition of resi-
dency within the County was not met that the District 
Court had no jurisdiction and could not consider the case 
on its merits. In that case, the District Court involved 
found that the plaintiff was not a resident of the County 
where the action was brought, then entertained the cause 
on its merits and entered judgment against plaintiff. The 
Supreme Court modified the judgment to hold that the 
complaint was dismissed because the trial court had no 
jurisdiction stating: 
"If it finds that there was not such residence 
it has no power to further act as to the marriage 
contract and if it acts in such regard it exceeds its 
authority." 
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The action there had to be filed in the County where 
the plaintiff resided. The action here had to be filed in 
the County where the work was to be performed. In each 
case, the Legislature, for sound legislative reasons, imposed 
the statutory conditions. In either case, the District Court 
has no jurisdiction to proceed unless the statutory condition 
has been satisfied. Admittedly, there has been no compli-
ance here. The court, therefore, properly dismissed the ac-
tion below. 
c) Appellant's claimed right of action under said 
statutory provisions is barred by the special 
statute of limitations contained therein. 
Former Title 14, Chapter 1 provided in Section 2 spe-
cifically that aetion be commenced not later than one year 
after the "completion and final settlement" of the contract. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State, et al. v. Campbell Build-
ing Co., et al., 94 Utah 326, 77 P. 2d 341 stated as follows 
with respect to the proper interpretation and application 
of this language : 
"Final settlement within the statute does not 
mean final payment or final disposition of all mat-
ters under the contract. The time of final settle-
ment is the time when the obligee in the bond, the 
state, has administratively determined that per-
formance under the contract has been made by the 
contractor, and the obligee has determined the 
amount due under the contract; that is, the obligee 
has determined whether or not it has any claims 
to assert against the surety because of the contrac-
tor's failure to perform according to his obligations 
under the contract. 
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"* * * 
"'Final settlement' under the statute is the 
determination by the obligee as to whether it has 
any claims against the contractor, and what it con-
siders it owes the contractor. This could not be 
affected by the fact that the contractor may not 
agree with the determination. The most essential 
thing is whether the obligee asserts a right to re-
cover under the bond on a claim against the ~on­
tractor, except as such amount may affect the 
claim, if any, it asserts against the surety under 
the bond. The question as to whether there has 
been a 'final settlement' is not affected by the ac-
ceptance or rejection of the statement by the con-
tractor." 
Applying this test to the uncontroverted facts before 
the court at the hearing of the respective motions of the 
parties for summary judgment, it is dear that the date of 
"completion and final settlement" of the contract here in-
volved was May 2, 1963. On that date, D. Gordon String-
ham, being duly authorized, and acting for and on behalf 
of the State of Utah by and through the State Road Com-
mission, the obligee on the bond, made each of the required 
administrative determinations (R. 42-3) : 
1) The contractor completed performance of the con-
tract on December 13, 1962. 
2) The State of Utah had no claims to assert against 
either the contractor or its surety. 
3) The amount due the contractor. 
The court in the Campbell case at pages 333-4 of the 
Utah Reporter sets out verbatim the pertinent testimony 
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of the representative of the obligee. A comparison of that 
testimony with the affidavit of Mr. Stringham on file in 
this matter demonstrates that identical determinations 
were made in each case. The estimate prepared in the case 
at bar by Mr. Stringham is designated "15 and final" (R. 
44). It was the final administrative determination by the 
obligee, and at the date thereof, the statute of limitations 
commenced to run. 
The case at bar is much stronger than the Campbell 
case in that here the "estimate invoice" attached to the 
supplemental affidavit of D. Gordon Stringham demon-
strates that the administrative determination by the State 
of Utah was accepted and approved by the contractor and 
was paid by the obligee (R. 43-4). In the Campbell case, 
the contractor objected to the final estimate and in subse-
quent litigation demonstrated that the administrative de-
termination initially made in the State's estimate was in-
correct. Notwithstanding this fact, the court in the Camp-
bell case ruled that the "completion and final settlement", 
as contemplated by the statute, was the date upon which 
such administrative determination initially was made by 
the State Road Commission. 
In its Brief, Appellant seeks to follow two separate 
escape routes to avoid facing the uncontroverted facts 
which establish of record the "final settlement" date. 
Neither route is open to it. First, at page 3 of the Brief, 
Appellant tells the court that the "completion and final 
settlement" date is a "disputed fact". However, the ex-
istence of this claimed "disputed fact" did not preclude 
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Appellant below from praying for summary judgment, re-
lying upon the various affidavits of D. Gordon Stringham 
(R. 35-6, 42-3, 46-7), and affirmatively asserting to the 
court below "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact" (R. 37). It is pertinent here to note also that the 
affidavits submitted by Appellant in support of its motion 
for s.ummary judgment do not relate to any "common-law" 
claim, but establish facts material only to the statutory 
claim. 
We submit that the action of Appellant below brings 
this case within the teachings of Mastic Tile Division of 
the Ruberoid Company v. Acme Distributing Company, 
Feb. 1964, 15 Utah 2d 136, 389 P. 2d 56. There, as here, 
both parties submitted the issues on documentary evidence 
to the trial court inviting summary judgment. There, as 
here, after entry of summary judgment, one of the parties 
claimed that disputed facts existed. In discussing such 
claim, this court stated: 
"Both sides laid the matter in the lap of the 
court by their mutual motions, and under the facts 
of this particular case unequivocally invited and 
authorized the court to decide the case by interpret-
ing the documents. This the court did. Having done 
so in a case like this, where interpretation of the 
writings was the only issue, we do not think the 
court should be required to submit to the subsequent 
urging of the loser that although he took his chances 
without reservation, he must have another go at 
the case, - although it is conceivable that in some 
other and unusual case this might be so." 
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The second route of attempted escape is by inaccurate 
statement of claimed fact. At page 15 of the Brief, Appel-
lant glibly states that the "complete performance and final 
settlement" date was "May 21, 1963". The facts establish 
by the record in this regard are summarized as follows : 
1) In paragraph 5 of his first affidavit, D. Gordon 
Stringham states the conclusion that "date of complete 
performance and final settlement" was "May 21, 1963" 
(R. 36). 
2) In paragraph 2 of his supplemental affidavit (R. 
42-3), Mr. Stringham "supplements and amends" para-
graph 5 of his prior affidavit "relating to his conclusion 
as to the date of 'complete performance and final settle-
ment' " by setting forth the underlying facts. Those facts 
are: 
(a) Contract was completed on December 13, 1962. 
(b) Determination of amount due from the obligee 
to the contractor and that the obligee had no 
claims against either the contractor or the surety 
was made on May 2, 1963. 
( c) Letter was mailed on May 21, 1963 indicating 
approval for payment after acceptance of the 
State's "15 and final" estimate by the contractor. 
3) In paragraph 2 of Mr. Stringham's "second sup-
plemental affidavit" (R. 46-7), he reiterates that the 
obligee's final estimate (made on May 2, 1963) "consti-
tutes a determination by the Commission that it has no 
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claims to assert against the contractor or its surety and 
the amount due to the contractor". 
We submit that under the doctrine of the Campbell 
case, these facts demonstrate conclusively that the "final 
settlement" date was May 2, 1963. 
Appellant's action below admittedly was not filed 
within one year after May 2, 1963. The action, therefore, 
is barred by the very statute upon which it purports to be 
based and the complaint below was properly dismissed. 
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOV-
ERY AGAINST RESPONDENTS UNDER THE 
PROVISIONS OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER 1, SEC-
TIONS 5-9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Effective May 14, 1963, Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections 
1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 was repealed and a new 
public contract bonding statute was enacted in its place 
which is now contained in Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections 
5-9. Assuming for purposes of this discussion, that the 
provisions of the new statute are controlling, Appellant's 
action below still was properly dismissed. Appellant failed 
to comply with three mandatory requirements of the new 
statute which will be discussed below: 
a) Appellant did not comply with the notice re-
quirements of said statutory provisions. 
Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 6, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 sets forth jurisdictional notice requirements and pro· 
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vides that the claimant "shall not have a right of action 
upon such payment bond" unless he has given the pre-
scribed notice. Since the record contains no averment of 
compliance with such requirements, Appellant had no right 
of action under the bonding statute which was in effect at 
the time this action was filed. 
b) The District Court in Salt Lake County had 
no jurisdiction to hear the subject action for 
the reason that an action upon the bond must 
be filed in an appropriate court in the politi-
cal subdivision in which the contract was to 
be performed. 
Again, the complaint avers and the fact is uncontro-
verted that the contract here involved was to be performed 
in Daggett County, State of Utah. Title 14, Chapter 1, 
Section 6 requires that "every suit instituted" on the stat-
utory bond "shall be brought in the appropriate court in 
the political subdivision in which the contract was to be 
performed, and not elsewhere". The same arguments ap-
ply to this statutory provision which were made under 
Point III hereof, sub-paragraph b. It follows that the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County had no jurisdiction to en-
tertain this particular action under the provisions of the 
new statute. 
c) Appellant's claimed right of action, if pro-
cessed under said statutory provisions, would 
be barred by the special statute of limita-
tions contaUried therein. 
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Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 7, Utah Code Annotated 
' 1953 provides in pertinent part: 
"* * * Provided, however, that no such 
suit shall be commenced after the expiration of one 
year .from the date on which the plaintiff performed 
the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the 
last of the materials for which the suit is brought, 
except, that if the claimant is a subcontrador of the 
contractor, no such suit shall be commenced after 
the expiration of one year from the date on which 
final payment under the subcontract became due." 
The claimant here was not a subcontractor of the con-
tractor. The claimant was a materialman who supplied 
petroleum products to a subcontractor; hence, the one year 
statute of limitations commenced to run upon the date 
when Appellant supplied the last petroleum products to the 
subcontractor. Attached to the affidavit of W. L. Olsen 
filed in support of Appellant's motion for summary judg-
ment are statements demonstrating that the last petroleum 
products were supplied to the subcontractor on December 
10, 1962. Therefore, it was required to file its action un-
der the terms of the new statute on or before December 10, 
1963. Having failed to do so, the action was barred by the 
special statute of limitations contained in the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant here filed a complaint asserting a statutory 
cause of action. Neither the complaint nor any other doc-
ument contained in the record on appeal would reasonably 
apprise the adverse parties or the court that Appellant de-
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sired in the alternative to assert a common-law third party 
beneficiary claim. 
The record demonstrates and the court below found 
that Appellant did not comply with required statutory con-
ditions. The statutory remedies are exclusive. The provi-
sions of the public contract bonding statutes (both old and 
new) preclude recovery under the facts of this case. 
Through this appeal, the Appellant seeks to amend 
its pleadings, to assert a new cause of action and to obtain 
automatic judgment - this without the aid of averment 
or proof. It should not be permitted so to do. 
We submit that the order and judgment entered by 
the court below from which this appeal is taken was duly 
and properly entered and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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